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 South Korea’s Daewoo Logistics, using no discretion, announced its successful 
acquisition of 1.3 million hectares of farmland in Madagascar three years ago. One-half 
of the island nation’s arable land was up for negotiation. Hypothetically, Daewoo could 
export all produce from the ambitious maize and palm oil plantations and import all 
personnel, as Malagasy investment laws stipulated no labor requirements.1 With few 
taxable strings attached, meager job creation prospects for the Malagasy people and 
virtually no rental terms, the announcement of the 99-year lease stirred public outrage 
and proved consequential in the ousting of President Marc Ravalomanana in 2009. A 
Wikileaks cable disclosed the flustered attempt by the Malagasy Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to deny the transaction, stating that the deal was not yet approved, nor had it 
moved past the first stage of “land prospecting.”2 Nevertheless, the swift coup d’etat 
followed after 130 people were killed during violent protests organized by an opposition 
party. Later findings, unexamined by news headlines, suggest that the “Daewoo affair” 
was an unseemly outgrowth of Ravalomanana’s previous efforts to liberalize trade and 
position his own companies to reap the benefits in critical sectors.3  
 This phenomenon is not uncommon. Daewoo’s notorious failure in Madagascar 
did not halt the successful, worldwide transfer of 45 million hectares of land to foreign 
investors by early 2011.4 This paper addresses the global “land grab” issue exclusively in 
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 Explained in greater detail in: “Marc the medici? The failure of a new form of neopatrimonial rule in 
Madagascar,” by R. Marcus, 2010, Political Science Quarterly, 125, p. 111-131. Various news agencies 
also reported on the acquisition. See: “Daewoo to pay nothing for vast land acquisition,” S. Jung-a, C. 
Oliver, & T. Burgis,  20 November 2008,  Financial Times. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b0099666-b6a4-11dd-89dd-0000779fd18c.html#axzz1gUPqYJk9 
2
 For a link to the cable leak, go here: http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/19168 
3
 Marcus, “Neopatrimonial rule in Madagascar,” 2010. 
4
 “The politics of agrofuels and mega-land and water deals: insights from the ProCana case, Mozambique,” 
S. M. Borras Jr, D. Fig, & S. M. Suarez, 2011, Review of African Political Economy, 38, p. 215-234. 
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relation to Africa, where over two-thirds of these mega-land deals transpire.5 Foreign 
investments in African commercial agriculture are commonly discussed within the 
framework of neo-colonialism or, conversely, in prescriptions offered to investors by 
international organizations with attempts to make the investments more “responsible”.6 
While bringing into focus both the investors and global trends driving the surge in 
commercial appetite for African farmland, popular narratives pay little attention to the 
host government’s policies and role in facilitating the investments and expropriation of 
peasant land. This concern is central to my research question: why do African ruling 
elites choose policies that promote these investments? 
 In this paper, I contend that shifting the discussion would better shed light on the 
relationship between current investment trends and neoliberal reforms in Africa, without 
condemning foreign investment altogether or further polarizing international debates on 
the matter. To be more precise, in highlighting the role of the state, we will better 
understand both the real implications of “land grabbing” for African societies and how 
the pursuit of investment and related reforms fit into everyday state practices – that is, the 
very ways that governance is orchestrated in African states along local, global, formal, 
and informal lines.  Determining the relative influence of external actors and 
organizations in shaping these practices requires an analysis of two approaches that will 
be explored in this paper: the externalist approach and the neo-patrimonial approach. I 
hypothesize that the project of Frelimo elites cannot be fully captured by the externalist 
approach and that the party instead makes deliberate use of these reforms as a tactic to 
                                                      
5
 “Vast bio-fuel demand drives ‘land grabs’”, 28 February 2011, America: Signs of the Times. 
6
 Among them: “Principles for responsible agricultural investment that respects rights, livelihoods, and 
resources,” World Bank, 2010, Washington DC; Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural 
investment and international land deals in Africa, L. Cotula, S. Vermeulen, R. Leonard, & J. Keeley, 2009, 
London: IIED, FAO, IFAD. 
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manage and control a network of domestic actors while maintaining the flow of external 
resources into a reorganized clientelist system – what Foucault called “governmentality” 
and what Bayart termed “extraversion”.7 Ruling elite factions happily employ certain 
neoliberal reforms, such as removing investment regulations, capital restrictions, and 
“inefficient” social service programs or state functions. These are but a series of practices 
that sustain financial support from IFIs/aid donors and paradoxically centralize party-
state control over the economy, the political system, and access to socioeconomic 
mobility. 
Layout of the paper 
In the first section, I describe in greater depth the trends and actors driving the 
global land rush and the implications this wave of investments may have for African 
economies and citizens. A continental overview will be followed by current debates on 
the “land grab” question and a brief account of mega-land deals in Mozambique. The 
second section will review scholarly literature concerned with neoliberalism, economic 
reform across Africa, and theories on elite policymaking. This will introduce the two 
debates, as well as current work that transcends both approaches. Theory will then be 
supplemented by a third section recounting the historical shift of Mozambique’s ruling 
party from socialist, one-party rule through a series of liberal reforms and brief stint as a 
multiparty democracy, followed by the return to a single party-state system. Both the 
history of reform and contradictory trends in current reforms (e.g. reversal of democratic 
reforms) will be discussed in regards to the externalist approach (where neocolonial 
                                                      
7
 “Governmentality” is briefly discussed in “The political economy of global neoliberal governance,” M. 
De Angelis, 2005, in Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 28, p. 229-257. Gillian Hart expands the definition 
as “strategic interventions exercised delicately and at a distance to transform citizens into consumers and 
entrepreneurial subjects who will take responsibility for themselves,” when describing neoliberalism in 
South Africa. (2008; pg. 689).  
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adherents would fall) and the neopatrimonial approach.  External factors that hastened the 
transition to a post-socialist Mozambique in the 1980s and 1990s continue to influence 
the regime as it now expeditiously implements neoliberal reforms, but the degree has 
changed. I will then also apply the two hypotheses to current reforms to land and 
investment laws. Next, I will test the “externalist hypothesis” using measures of foreign 
aid flows, loans, and conditionality to determine continued foreign influence on 
policymaking. This will be followed by tests of the “neo-patrimonial” hypothesis, 
hearkening back to previous reform processes, interviews, NGO activity within 
Mozambique, and an inspection of how farmland has been leased to foreign investors. 
Both approaches will be evaluated and compared in relation to the findings and my 
thesis. In the final section, I will relate my findings to future research imperatives for 
analyzing neoliberal projects and foreign investment in other African states and what 
effects these studies will have on scholarly and policy-related discussions of Africa’s 
“place” in the wider world.  
Foreign commercial agriculture is an important topic to consider in current 
discussions about the African political economy.  Foreign investment in this sector has 
become an integral part of current economic policymaking strategies among African 
ruling elites, albeit in an unprecedented fashion. For instance, governments have 
extended liberalization beyond improving conditions for investment to encompass 
sweeping reforms governing the rights and access to land. Consider Ethiopia and 
Mozambique, where foreign land leases were legalized in 1996 and 1997 respectively. 
Popular journalistic and activist accounts hold that land conflicts and other 
socioeconomic consequences for rural communities are precipitated by the external 
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imposition of interests and reforms, an updated neo-colonialism. However, this approach 
gives only piecemeal attention to the current role of ruling elites and therefore does not 
fully recognize the inconsistencies of these reforms and state policymaking gestures that 
alone impede potential development opportunities foreign investment might otherwise 
bring. Neoliberal reforms have often been unevenly applied, though wholly encouraged 
by donors, the World Bank, and the IMF. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of academic literature 
analyzing African neoliberal reforms during the past few decades deplore the chilling 
effects of the neoliberal model on state institutions, economies, societies, and 
development. Given the troubling history and current public outcry in various African 
civil societies, the tenacious return to neoliberal reform now is perplexing, if we take 
“neocolonialism” as our vantage point. With that in mind, exploring why African states 
actively pursue large-scale foreign agricultural investments and broader neoliberal 
reforms bears upon questions of state practices, autonomy, and foreign influences in the 
current reform era. Again, these questions are inevitably tied up with current insights into 
what African governance or the African state looks like. 
As many large-scale projects fail to pan out and investors close operations or 
withdraw completely, their very character reveals that Mozambique’s neoliberal turn is in 
actuality, only partial and asymmetrical. In this way, the neo-patrimonial approach may 
better capture how the African state navigates reform while under some influence from 
external forces. However, like the dominant parties of other African states, in 
Mozambique there are clearly separate “factions” of Frelimo and it is unfair to surmise 
that elite orientations are homogenous. Though there is a dominant and identifiable 
“predatory group”, there is also a faction genuinely working for development ends. This 
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differentiation is also emphasized by Fairbairn (2011) and Buur et. al (2011) who 
conducted extensive interviews within the country. Unlike other African states, Frelimo 
has enjoyed its position as a one-party state since independence in 1975 and has created a 
patronage system first beholden to urban support from middle classes, support which has 
recently eroded. Scholars have pointed to a shift in Frelimo’s support base, as the party 
increasingly favors a domestic capitalist class and foreign investors.8 What emerges is a 
“neoliberal” non-governmental state in which access to state structures is still crucial but 
the state simultaneously withdraws from traditional functions (developmentalist work and 
social policies), outsourcing these functions to NGOs or private companies. This 
“neoliberal governmentality” involves a complex constellation of influences that is 
insufficiently accounted for in the externalist approach. 
Snatched? An overview of global land grabbing 
Universal crises involving food and energy security have coalesced to instigate a 
unique shift in strategy amongst governments and transnational firms to buy or lease 
fertile land in the developing world. The competition for preferential access to land is 
unprecedented. It is estimated that 15-20 million hectares of farmland in developing 
nations changed hands between 2006 and 2009.9 Liken these figures to World Bank 
estimates in late 2010, which totaled 45 million, and now 80 million total hectares 
projected in 2011, and the escalating trend of these “mega-land deals” is striking.10 
Whether driven by profit, or a means to bypass the volatile global market for food prices 
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 J. Sumich, “Politics after the time of hunger,” 2008, p. 333-334; J. Sumich, “Frelimo and social 
stratification,” 2010; J. Hanlon, “Renewed land debate,” 2004.  
9
 L. Cotula, S. Vermeulen, & J. Keeley, Land grab or development opportunity?: agricultural investment 
and international land deals in Africa, 2009. 
10
 Borras et al, 2011, “Politics of agrofuels and mega-land and water deals,” 215-234; Deininger, K. and D. 
Byerlee with J. Lindsay, A. Norton, H. Selod, & M. Stickler, 2010, Rising global interest in farmland: can 
it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?; The Economist, 5 May 2011,  “Evidence is piling up against 
acquisitions of farmland in poor countries.” Retrieved from http://africanliberty.org/node/1173. 
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and supply, or perhaps to seek viable avenues for bio-fuels production, these actors 
intend to grow and export crops on suitable soil – and predominantly African soil.11  
Borras and Franco describe land grabbing as the “catch-all phrase to refer to the 
current explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions mainly revolving 
around the production and export of food, animal feed, biofuels, timber, and minerals.”12  
Governments and sovereign wealth funds from China, India, Saudi Arabia, and South 
Korea (among others) are also predominant actors; these regions are facing the 
intertwined crises of spikes in global food prices, population booms, desertification, and 
burgeoning middle classes demanding a diversified diet. Securing farmland in the 
developing world, where land is perceived as “underutilized”, cheap, and abundant, is a 
new if controversial strategy for attaining food security. If the era of low global prices for 
grains is over, states with a well-developed agricultural sector and little land pressure are 
in an envious position for maintaining domestic stability; indeed a report released by the 
World Bank in June 2010 announced that 44 million people have been pushed into 
poverty due to the global price spikes.13 Because the growing interest spans both food 
concerns and programs in Western Europe to cut carbon emissions and pursue alternative 
fuels, more cultivated land has also been diverted from food crops to biofuels. The United 
States, historically serving as the world’s emergency reserve for grain, has been 
converting millions of tons of grain (now over ¼ of total harvest) into ethanol every year. 
If it becomes increasingly profitable to convert grain into fuel, the price of grain may rise 
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 Over 60% of allocations took place in African states; in 2011 this totals approximately 48 million 
hectares alone in Africa. This figure appeared in “Vast bio-fuel demand drives ‘land grabs’” in America: 
Signs of the Times (28 February 2011).  
12
 S. M. Borras Jr & J. Franco, “Global land grabbing and trajectories of agrarian change: a preliminary 
analysis,” 2011, Journal of Agrarian Change, 12: 34-59. 
13
 “Let them eat bread: how food subsidies prevent (and provoke) revolutions in the Middle East,” A. 
Ciezadlo, 23 March 2011, Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67672/annia-ciezadlo/let-them-eat-bread. 
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to match fluctuations in oil prices. Speculative demand for land then, is in part a 
consequence of the newly lucrative biofuels industry. 
Perceptions of abundant cheap land, few overhead costs, and little government 
regulation have led to many ambitious and controversial deals or “land grabs”. While 
certain high-profile acquisitions have failed, these blunders have not short-circuited the 
approval of hundreds of other projects. This trend is by no means decreasing; nor has the 
scale of these individual projects been tempered. Daewoo’s attempt to lease 1.3 million 
hectares for 99 years to produce corn and palm oil and the ousting of the Malagasy 
president that followed was an isolated but powerful incident. Some governments will 
cancel deals where companies do not develop the land according to an agreed timeline; 
other projects may be downsized. Karuturi Global Ltd, an Indian firm, successfully 
secured 300,000 ha in the Gambella region of Ethiopia. But in May 2011, Ethiopia’s 
federal government reduced the allocation as agricultural ministers allegedly realized that 
a 1,160 square mile project is unmanageable.14 Saudi Star has been more successful and 
plans to spend $2 billion acquiring 500,000 ha of land in the same country. Their newly 
erected greenhouses already supply wheat, rice, vegetables, and flowers for the Saudi 
market.15 Other projects include “carbon credit” and timber farms– such as the Malonda 
Foundation’s 60,000 ha intended for eucalyptus and pine trees in the Niassa Province of 
Mozambique.16 The array of actors from Western and non-Western states complicate the 
neo-colonial indictment. 
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 “Ethiopian Government Slashes Karuturi Global Land Concession,” William Davison, 4 May 2011, 
Business Week. Retrieved from: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-05-04/ethiopian-government-
slashes-karuturi-global-land-concession.html 
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  “How food and water are driving a 21st century land grab,” J. Vidal, 6 March 2010, The Guardian. 
Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/mar/07/food-water-africa-land-grab. 
16
 Lords of the land: preliminary analysis of the phenomenon of land grabbing in Mozambique, N. Matavel 
& S. D. V. Cabanelas, 2011, Justiça Ambiental/UNAC: Maputo.  
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These projects are situated in states riddled with poverty and food insecurity. And 
though issues related to land tenure, rights, and access are still very controversial in most 
African states (where much of the land is state or community owned), large-scale 
agricultural investments are now actively endorsed by governments and facilitated by 
investment promotion agencies in these countries. 17 Moreover, and compounding 
domestic struggles in food production, many African governments don’t seem terribly 
attentive to register their own communities in new demarcations, though some 
governments have been inclined to either partially or fully privatize state-owned land. For 
example, Ethiopia has avoided privatizing state-owned land but under the Derg reforms, 
ironically guarantees access to government-controlled leases for mostly foreign 
companies. On the one hand, most African states were previously reluctant to privatize 
land, not to mention leasing or selling it to foreign companies in a tense post-colonial era 
where doing so would look like the antithesis of independence and delegitimize the ruling 
party. On the other hand, not only is the history of neoliberal policymaking in Africa 
widely considered lamentable – as evidenced by innumerous academic accounts of 
African neoliberal “travails”18 – but the global financial crisis seems to have compelled a 
global shift away from the Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus 
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 Since the 1980s, “investment promotion agencies” or IPAs have been established and institutionalized  in 
over 150 countries, a development encouraged in part by the UN and the IMF.  We might say that the 
proliferation of these agencies  reflects the competition amongst governments for FDI, though their role in 
investments varies across states.  These centers  serve as proxies for foreign investors, but more 
importantly, they often  function as a state agency to monitor, screen, and restrict investment. Increasingly, 
they are used as a marketing mechanism to attract investment. If the role played by these IPAs has 
expanded in other states besides Mozambique - especially in regards to investments in farmland - there is 
little or no commentary by scholars on IPAs.  
18
 “Economic faith, social project and a misreading of African society: the travails of neoliberalism in 
Africa,” G. Harrison, 2005, Third World Quarterly, 26: 1303-1320. 
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towards a Beijing Consensus.19 That is, state capitalism paired with regulation or 
restrictions on investment and the financial sector seem to be more widely preferred as 
policy options across the developing world and even in the EU.20 Nevertheless, various 
African regimes are moving toward free-market policies that send a most fervent message 
to foreign investors and corporations: “We are open for business!” So paltry are the terms 
and tremendous the interest – “land grabbing” is but the newest manifestation driving and 
being driven by policymaking. But existing work on African politics and elite 
policymaking doesn’t seem content to discuss these issues strictly in terms of “rent-
seeking.” What other frameworks have been offered? 
Invoking a familiar stigma: neocolonialism? 
Foreign, large-scale land acquisitions have led to a compelling accusation on the 
part of NGOs, civil society organizations, and international media: commercial 
agricultural investments (or “land grabs”) bespeak a new era of neo-colonialism.  
The neo-colonial thesis contends that former colonial powers and the international 
financial institutions under their control actively (if discreetly) continue to exploit former 
colonies, and that the skewed economic relationships characterized by colonial rule are 
left largely intact and consistently reproduced. This top-down phenomenon involves the 
                                                      
19
 “Washington Consensus” refers to the set of neoliberal development policies promoted by the IMF and 
World Bank during the 1980s and 1990s, involving economic liberalization, privatization, export-led 
growth, and little government intervention in the economy. Some have argued that there has been a shift to 
a “Post-Washington Consensus”, or a move away from policy conditionality and toward a goal of poverty 
reduction and “country ownership” of policy-making. Nevertheless, the same neo-liberal policy package is 
unchanged, though there is new focus on governance and social policy. For more, see: “Toward an 
inclusive-neoliberal regime of development: from the Washington to the Post-Washington consensus,” A. 
Ruckert, 2006, Labour, Capital, & Society, 39: 34-67. 
20
 The Beijing Consensus refers to the “Chinese economic growth model” widely defined as involving 
long-term strategies,  greater government interference, corporate and bank allegiance to the government,  
and a more regulated market. Heads of State such as President Jacob Zuma have directly referred to the 
Chinese model of a “developmental state” as desirable where market forces alone may be insufficient for 
national goals of job creation and building infrastructure. See: http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-03-zuma-
adopts-chinese-model/ 
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question of power imbalances between Western and non-Western governments as well as 
dependencies masked by the “trappings of international sovereignty” – where 
responsibility for developmental woes is ascribed to post-colonial governments, even as 
their political and economic systems are somewhat directed from the outside.21 Foreign 
capital is thus understood to be used not for development, but for the exploitation of these 
less developed regions. Understood this way, “land grabbing” is an attempt by former 
colonial powers, their companies, and IFIS to impose policies on African states that allow 
for these investments and extraction of crops to transpire, under the banner of 
“development”. Existing power imbalances leave African governments unable to 
negotiate the terms. Consequently, the static colonial relationship is maintained; African 
states remain exporters of raw materials – their land commodified, re-parceled. But neo-
colonialism’s applicability as an analytical and explanatory tool may not be very useful 
today if neoliberal reforms related to foreign agricultural investments are driven in large 
part by internal, local mechanisms and not simply imposed by external actors – be they 
investors, multinational corporations, or international financial institutions. Marking a 
stark departure from previous decades of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) imposed 
by aid donors and international financial institutions, the use of strictly “externalist” or 
“neocolonialist” accounts to explain the move towards neoliberalism in African states is 
insufficient to capture current realities.22 
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 Neo-colonialism, the last stage of imperialism, K. Nkrumah, 1965. 
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 Recent scholarly work on farmland acquisitions and bio-fuels in Africa discuss the limits of the 
externalist account as well: “Indirect expropriation: the role of national institutions and domestric elites in 
the Mozambican farmland grab,” M. Fairbairn, 2011 April 6-8, LDPI/Journal of Peasant Studies (presented 
at International Conference  on Global Land Grabbing); S. Borras et al, 2011, “Politics of agro-fuels in 
mega-land and water deal,” 215-234. 
 12 
“Development” and its discontents 
FIAN International, GRAIN, and La Via Campesina (among others) represent 
small farmers and peasant communities across the developing world. These groups 
convened in the summer of 2011 to articulate the Dakar Appeal, which demands that all 
massive agribusiness land grabs be ceased and that mandatory guidelines for respecting 
peasants’ rights to the land be established by the UN’s World Food Security committee 
(CFS).23 This appeal was then presented to the G20 Forum in France. Indeed, as African 
governments hand over parcels of land to foreign companies under the official banner of 
“development opportunities”, allegations of villagers forcefully evicted from communal 
lands, left displaced and uncompensated, give credibility to the neo-colonial indictment.24 
In response to these ongoing accusations, a spate of reports were released by the World 
Bank, FAO, IFAD, and others to recognize the risks of these investments, provide data on 
various projects, and impart policy recommendations and conditions that would make 
these investments “work for development”.25 Pledging full-time jobs during 
consultations, recent surveys of the few projects actually running show little rural job 
creation. A World Bank report found one Mozambican project that initially promised 
2,650 jobs was in actuality hiring only 35-40 workers.26 Jobs may be seasonal and the 
location of the projects may spawn new trends in migratory labor. Given the outcry from 
civil society and unequal access to land tenure and credit, the acquisitions don’t seem like 
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 “G-20 agriculture: hundreds of organizations say STOP farmland grabbing!” 20 June 2011, Food First: 
Institute for food and development policy, retrieved from: http://www.foodfirst.org/en/land+grabs. 
24
 See Al Jazeera’s recent video release featuring the Ugandan case of 22,000 people allegedly forced from 
their land as UK’s New Forest Company launches a 40,000 ha project. The video can be found here: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/video/africa/2011/09/2011922111515150690.html 
25
 Deininger, K. et al, Rising global interest in farmland, 2010;  L. S. Cotula, S. Vermeulen, R. Leonard, & 
J. Keeley, Land grab or development opportunity, 2009. 
26
 Deininger, K. et al, Rising global interest in farmland, 2010; The Economist, 5 May 2011, “Evidence is 
piling up against acquisitions of farmland in poor countries.” Retrieved from 
http://africanliberty.org/node/1173. 
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an “easy fit” for a sustainable modus operandi of national development. Lester Brown’s 
commentary captures other limitations in sparking a culture for commercial agriculture in 
the developing world: 
 
It could take many years to realize any substantial production gains. The public 
infrastructure for modern market-oriented agriculture does not yet exist in most of Africa. 
In some countries it will take years just to build the roads and ports needed to bring in 
agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and to export farm products. Beyond that, modern 
agriculture requires its own infrastructure: machine sheds, grain-drying equipment, silos, 
fertilizer storage sheds, fuel storage facilities, equipment repair and maintenance services, 
well-drilling equipment, irrigation pumps, and energy to power the pumps.27 
 
On the other hand, considering that these nations have suffered from decades of 
underinvestment, notable scholars, such as Paul Collier, lamented that watchdog 
organizations have dismissed the possibility of any benefit arising from these 
investments.28 If not commercial agriculture, it is unclear what other promising channels 
are feasible that will reduce the dependence of African nations on foreign food aid and 
food imports. The romanticism associated with subsistence agriculture, African 
peasantry, and “self-sufficiency” is unlikely to prove –and hasn’t proved – effective to 
eliminate poverty and malnourishment.  Collier explains the inefficacy of smallholder 
techniques with the rising population of urban dwellers and urban slums; peasants 
seeking real wages in formal jobs have abandoned farming to head to the cities. 
Accelerating productivity by coordinating disparate smallholders is an unlikely strategy, 
though Collier does not go to great depths to explain why. But it’s the very instance of 
these divergent positions that polarize the “land grab” debate that prompt us to ask 
critical questions about Africa’s integration (or lack thereof) into the global economy, its 
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 “The new geopolitics of food,” L. R. Brown, May/June 2012, Foreign Policy. Accessed from: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_new_geopolitics_of_food. 
28
“The politics of hunger: how illusion and greed fan the food crisis,” P. Collier, 2010, Foreign Affairs, 87: 
67-79. 
 14 
status within that system, and the likelihood that increased foreign investment will bear 
fruit and for whom. 
After the University of Sussex held an international conference on land grabbing 
earlier in April 2011, analyzing over 100 deals, experts seem to conclude that the “results 
are damning.”29 Because few states boast formal and transparent procedures that specify 
the rights and obligations of all parties involved and those that do often ignore 
longstanding laws on communal land tenure and use rights, its hardly unfathomable that 
the conference would reach such a bold conclusion. Yet as projects fail to develop or 
prospects disintegrate not long after investors acquire their land parcels, continued 
debates about whether or not to write off the investments don’t seem quite right – and 
they don’t seem to confront larger trends. The polemic atmosphere lingers, suggesting 
that new questions must be asked and more critical analysis undertaken. Though it is 
undeniable that the outlook for these investments is altogether rather bleak (both unlikely 
to take off due to problems of infrastructure and misperception of costs and likely to 
produce mixed results to the detriment of Africans), the trend begs for an explanation of 
why African ruling elites seem to be encouraging these investments within broader 
appeals for development. One might retort, point blank, “corruption!” and would sorely 
overlook how ruling elites justify their policies and negotiate their positions within 
market-inspired, neoliberal frameworks. It would also ignore the local and global 
intersections where strategies to encourage “land grabbing” are chosen.  
From a Mozambican angle 
 In 2009, the Republic of Mozambique released the “National Biofuels Policy and 
Strategy”, ironically mimicking the former Portuguese colonial administration by 
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“Evidence is piling up against acquisitions of farmland in poor countries,” 5 May 2011, The Economist. 
Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/node/18648855. 
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encouraging farmers across the central and southern provinces to cultivate a single bio-
fuel crop - jatropha. Unmatched by many Western governments, at first glance this policy 
move seems strikingly progressive for promoting alternative energy solutions. But 
unbeknownst to farmers at the time, jatropha hoards water that would otherwise be 
devoted to food crops. Moreover, its yields vary widely as the plant species have yet to be 
domesticated. Dismissing these complications, the plant was nevertheless “rediscovered” 
in 2005 as a low-emissive and cheap fuel alternative by energy research institutes in 
Japan and Indonesia, programs funded by car companies like Mitsubishi to honor the 
Kyoto Protocol.30 Jatropha is one of the few biofuel crops that can be substituted for jet 
fuel and was identified by Goldman Sachs in 2007 as one of the best alternatives for 
diesel. Not long after this pronouncement, Mozambique was identified by the 
International Energy Agency as boasting one of the largest biofuels production potentials 
in Africa.31 A new wave of interested investors from Western Europe and Canada took 
note, which in part spawned the Mozambican “land grab”. As most of these products are 
not consumable by local markets and are wholly intended for export, it is unclear what 
benefits exist for its citizens, especially rural populations. This is but one crop of interest 
in Mozambique; others include sugarcane and maize.  
 At the outset, Mozambican elites spoke of “environmental protection” and 
“sustainable energy for domestic consumption” with optimistic, persuasive vigor. And 
farmers took to the fields, convinced that they would receive 10 meticals (1 met = 28 
USD) for every kilogram of jatropha seed they produced. Recall that this is a country 
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where 75% of the Mozambican population engages in subsistence farming and 35% of all 
households suffer from chronic food insecurity.32 Outsourcing biofuels production to a 
developing country where the prospects for job creation and rural development are 
dubious has placed Mozambique among the countries under heavy scrutiny from NGOs 
that seek to protect the rural peasantry from the whims of investors. 
 By the end of 2009 and among sub-Saharan African states, Mozambique was 
second only to Sudan in the number of total hectares allocated, before the government 
froze all mega-land lease approvals pending the current Agricultural Zoning Process in 
2010.33 Between 2006 and 2009, over 2.67 million hectares of land, or 405 documented 
projects, were leased to investors in a country where all land is nationalized.34 As 
Mozambique features prominently among states encouraging foreign large-scale 
investments and because the state was determinedly socialist following the immediate 
years of independence from Portuguese colonialism, it makes for a particularly curious 
case with regards to neoliberal reforms. Furthermore, the ruling party Frelimo was 
essentially forced (in desperation) to abandon its Stalinist-Leninist platform for Western 
aid and liberal reform during a brutal 16-year-long civil war. Upon first glance, the 
country’s experience with externally imposed structural adjustment and the government’s 
enduring dependence on aid donors for over 50% of its annual budget may give weight to 
the neo-colonial thesis. But Mozambique’s unique experience with colonialism and its 
history as a Third World post-revolutionary regime suggests otherwise, as does the way 
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in which current investments and reforms are being conducted. A deep-seated socialist 
ideological platform long upheld by “old vanguard” elites in ministerial positions today 
seems equally likely to affect the ruling party’s will to transition fully to a free market 
economy, which also complicates the neocolonial approach. Likewise, because 
neopatrimonial adherents hold that all African states are virtually indistinguishable in 
their statecraft; past or present ideological tensions within the ruling party – or whether 
the state’s experience is post-communist- are rendered inconsequential.  
After reviewing the existing literature on neoliberalism in Africa, I will analyze 
how Mozambique’s 1997 Land Law and its degree of political and economic 
liberalization in general engender a more complex understanding of elite policymaking as 
tied up with the workings and worldwide diffusion of free market globalization. Current 
narratives would do well to incorporate how social actors (beyond states, companies, and 
IGOs) feature within a global economy that simultaneously centralizes control within 
state governments while rendering governments obsolete. “Land grabbing” is but a new 
site where issues of state-building come back to the fore and where governments use 
“free market” policies to reconstruct social, public, and private space and remake the 
means for accumulation and privilege.  
Literature on (neo)liberal governance in Africa  
 Recent scholarship on governance and policymaking in Africa consistently 
employs neoliberalism to identify the forces that drive decision-making and reforms. 
Within the range of approaches experts have devised to explain African policymakers’ 
choices related to economic liberalization, generally one or both of these overarching 
axioms can be identified: the externalist approach or the agency approach. “Externalists” 
generally conceive of changes related to liberalization as directed from the outside, the 
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most glaring example being the IMF and World Bank’s imposition of structural 
adjustments programs (SAPs) in the 1980s as a condition of debt-restructuring. Thus 
changes to policymaking would be directly associated with external pressure from donor 
agencies, IFIs, and even various organs of the UN; African governments are perceived to 
have little control over their own social and economic policies – even today. Included in 
this camp are Marxists, dependency theorists, and most adherents to post-colonial 
literature. Conversely, the “agency approach” stresses the autonomy of African leaders in 
making decisions, and would relate changes to policymaking to the political interests of 
the state as well as the interests of influential groups within the regime’s support base. 
These “agency” theorists typically accentuate the declining influence of external agents, 
instead alluding to an altogether new structure of political constraints and opportunities 
that has emerged within the current global political economy. As this structure affords 
elites greater power in pursuing their own policy agendas, outright intervention by 
foreign agents is minimal.  
This binary opposition is admittedly problematic, like that of the structure-agent 
debate, because “agency” adherents are quick to acknowledge that chronic conditions of 
dependency do persist but stress the role of elites in maintaining those conditions. First 
and foremost, this particular debate in Africa takes as its starting point the framework of 
neoliberalism, which began and largely remains the model for development today. There 
are problems in identifying Africa’s experience with neoliberalism as unique from other 
regions or the rest of the world (an African exceptionalism), and deserving of exclusive 
study and theoretical analysis. Patron-client relations are not unique to Africa. Yet this 
 19 
regional and sometimes continental focus is dominant among scholars and useful for the 
purposes of this paper.  
Neoliberalism: an ever-elusive but powerful paradigm 
 Neoliberalism was also central to the critiques of interviewees from NGOs and 
the farmer’s organization UNAC whom I talked to while in Mozambique. The 
proliferation of conceptual schemes used to define or evaluate neoliberalism is nearly 
dizzying. As the concept grew popular in various American and British universities and 
later as a policy package put forth in the Washington Consensus, it then stirred more 
stigmatized commentary on state anomalies stemming from decades of these policies - 
especially following their heavy-handed imposition during the 1980s. For instance, recent 
research identifies current African manifestations of neoliberalism as “antipolitics” 
(Buscher), hegemony resulting from the colonization of discourse (Adesina 2004; Peet; 
Ayers), a national or universalized “social engineering project” (Hart 2008 ;Harrison); 
and as market-based governmentality (Ferguson 2010; de Angelis). Others focus their 
critique on the effects of adjustment on state capacity  (Oya; Matanga 2010) or the ways 
in which the African state has become a mouthpiece for global economic forces 
(Soderbaum; Taylor 2003). Similarly, where the term has been conflated with the notion 
of economic globalization, others associate African neoliberalism with the worldwide 
spread of a right-wing art of government and the demise of Keynesianism and the 
“developmentalist state” in the postwar era (Nasong’o 2004; Sassen 2010).35 Some 
Constructivists call this seemingly uncontested hegemony and spread of market reforms 
the “neoliberal norm” or to put it another way, the new “common sense” (Chwieroth).36  
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It’s easy to get lost in the commotion. Nevertheless, as the concept has expanded 
from macroeconomic fundamentals (or straightforward policy prescription) to an 
adjective used to describe reconstructed governance institutions and the African state 
itself, scholars have collectively deplored the heterogeneous outcomes of these policy 
orientations – most notably the “complex and diverse experiences” in sub-Saharan 
Africa.37 In this section, I will explore the history of neoliberalism and its uses, so to 
delineate which permutation is appropriate to employ with regards to current policy shifts 
in Mozambique accompanying mounting interest in the country’s fertile land. 
To start, we will trace the trajectory of the concept. The reshaping of 
neoliberalism over time is concurrent with shifts in scholars’ understandings of political 
agency in Africa. A founding premise precluding the rise of neoliberal orthodoxy is that 
free trade, private property rights, and unfettered markets lead to a richer and more 
tolerant world. Furthermore, it was assumed that through the cooperation of states to 
maintain international economic organizations (founded on these very principles), these 
axioms would be spread worldwide.38 The WTO is but one forum where state 
policymakers attempt to hold each other accountable to free trade agreements. But there 
occurred a gradual and important departure from the mainstream liberal discourse, which 
guided the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions in the late 1940s. “Embedded 
liberalism” in the immediate postwar era held that state intervention in the economy was 
necessary at times to support both national security and global stability, and indeed most 
newly independent Third World states pursued development within the rubric of import 
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substitution industrialization. Colossal increases in capital flows and “petrodollars” 
allowed African states to borrow heavily in the 1970s and “embedded liberalism” fell 
away as the aftermath of massive oil price hikes in 1979 led to equally massive rises in 
the interest rates on loans that African governments were unable to pay back. Balance of 
payments deficits and spiraling debt was blamed on the state-heavy approach to 
development, and so it was that the “structural adjustment era” began and neoliberal 
orthodoxy was gradually outlined throughout.39 Market triumphalism would further 
embed the neoliberal paradigm with the fall of the Soviet Union and what Fukuyama 
dubbed the “end of history” in 1989 – referring to the alleged end of competition between 
ideologies, giving way to the task and problematique of extending democratic and 
economic liberalism worldwide.40 Widespread consensus on the unfailing robustness of 
these policies awarded the doctrine unmatched credibility, a phenomenon that intrigues 
scholars even today: 
The differences that remained among neoclassical economists were one of degree rather 
than kind. Debates persisted within the profession about the importance of the pace and 
sequencing of liberalization, but not of its long-run desirability…Remarkably, this 
neoliberal consensus developed in the absence of unambiguous evidence confirming the 
benefits of liberalization and persisted until the Asian financial crisis.41 
 
Adesina would add that this consensus engendered an unprecedented “shrinking of policy 
space”, which contrasted what maneuvering room developing governments enjoyed 
during the 60s and 70s.42 Released by the World Bank in 1981, The Berg Report on 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa emerged concurrently with mounting popular regard 
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in Western media that cajoled these policies as the sure route for underdeveloped 
countries to join the global economy.43 At the outset of the 1980s, this unanimity 
pervaded development policy debates between the World Bank, IMF, and various UN 
institutions. Where the indebted African postcolonial state was concerned, it was deemed 
that market mechanisms were more efficient than state institutions in allocating resources 
and delivering services, especially as African government intervention was believed to be 
irreconcilably beholden to “rent-seeking, technological backwardness, and resource 
misallocation.”44 
The adjustment and post-adjustment era 
Structural adjustment can then be understood as one of the early fragments of 
African neoliberalism. It refers to the country-by-country intervention made on behalf of 
the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s to prevent developing states from defaulting on 
their loans and to ensure repayment to the teetering international banking system in two 
forms: writing off or rescheduling the debt of countries that adopted market-oriented 
strategies. Among experts, it was believed that shifting to an export-oriented economy 
would incur the foreign exchange reserves necessary for these states to repay the debt.45 
Turning strictly to neoclassical economics, a system of policy recommendations was then 
doled out indiscriminately to countries, a package that became known (later, pejoratively) 
as the “Washington Consensus.” Standard policy imperatives include measures to 
“reduce inflation, government expenditure, and the role of the government in the 
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economy, including trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation.”46 The public 
sector was to be compressed and reduced to make way for foreign investment and export-
oriented growth. Later criticized for its narrow applications, adverse socioeconomic 
repercussions, and its dismissal of the social relations that constitute and determine how a 
“liberal market” works, it is also interesting to note that total African debt amounted to 
$14.2 billion in 1974 and actually increased to over $150 billion by 1992.47 Though 
structural adjustment was intended to help African states reduce and pay back debt, 
governments during the era of adjustment became further and chronically indebted to the 
World Bank and IMF, the very institutions that imposed these policies. The removal of 
food subsidies that coincided with a contraction of government health and education 
spending would mire the urban poor, rural farmers, and other disadvantaged groups 
especially in relation to adult literacy rates and mortality rates. Instead of bringing Africa 
in line with the “global model”, in 2001 Africa claimed only 1.1% of global GDP, 0.6% 
of global foreign direct investment, and its average GNP per capita shrank 92%  between 
1970 and 1998.48 Average growth rates in sub-Saharan African states actively “adjusting” 
dropped to an average 3.5%, revealing that the region was falling far behind adjusting 
states elsewhere, a reality admitted by the World Bank in 1994.49  
Policies that were intended to correct what was surely a significant degree of 
inefficiency and corruption on the part of state institutions was arguably a drastic 
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wresting of sovereignty and what Ferguson describes as “governance from afar”.50 
Compounding issues of debt is the degree to which African states became dependent on 
donors to finance a substantial chunk of their state budgets – even countries that were 
labeled by the IMF as “adjustment success stories”. In 2000, two such success stories, 
Ghana and Uganda, depended on foreign aid for 98% and 76% of their budgets, 
respectively.51 International financial institutions, reflecting on the catastrophe of 
structural adjustment in the 1980s, formulated a new strategy for the 1990s focused not 
on “getting prices right” but on “getting governance right.” The shift to promoting 
democratic governance at first seems strikingly different from the Washington 
Consensus, but in reality only reinforced the same policy prescriptions and extended 
neoclassical logic to the political sphere. 
Rolling back while rolling out 
  The Post-Washington Consensus was developed to incorporate the “social” by 
focusing on good governance and democratization in order to better correct for “market 
imperfections.”52 During this era, many African states initiated multi-party elections and 
the World Bank applauded democratic reforms, transparency, and accountability as 
irreplaceable preconditions for economic development. In effect, the economic pitfalls of 
the 1980s were directly and solely associated with the “extensive personalization of 
power, widespread corruption, denial of fundamental human rights, and the prevalence of 
unelected and unaccountable governments” in African states.53 Pro-poor policies and 
improvements to the investment climate went hand-in-hand, though the IMF and World 
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Bank wanted these efforts to be provided for not by governments but by NGOs through 
the widening of “civil society”. The 1990s marked the extension of the neoliberal 
doctrine from sole economic core considerations to include and transform the very fabric 
of the “social”, beginning with state institutions. Where the SAPs of the ’80s had led to a 
retrenchment and “rolling back” of state functions and capacity, the post-Washington 
Consensus of the 1990s aimed to rebuild state capacity and “roll out” a new state that was 
more technocratic, a public sector that was managed and operated in a business manner, 
and  programs based on incentives and output with the explicit goal to tackle poverty.54 
And so it was that the “commercial principle” was inscribed into every realm of 
traditional state functions and service delivery, not limited to health, education, social 
security, sanitation, basic infrastructure, and even “pro-poor” programs.55  
Though this latter “Consensus” is less orthodox, ambitious, and concerns itself 
with interrelated issues of governance and poverty, most of the principles are vague and 
can be reduced to the mere continuance both of strict economic liberalization and a boost 
to the flow of loans, aid, and NGOs to cover what the private sector will not. Moreover, 
the current state of affairs seem to suggest that both adjustment eras eroded central state 
capacity and, contrary to one of its stated objectives, led to increased corruption, rent-
seeking, and greater inequality and marginalization for the majority of Africans.56 
Richard Sandbrook is most concise in summing up the concerns of most scholars toward 
the dual adjustment era:  
The report (Post-Washington Consensus) largely ignores or underplays the socio-political 
realities that will shape the success of this ambitious enterprise. Nor does it analyze 
several difficult dilemmas and trade-offs that will ensue. Unleashing entrepreneurship in 
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Africa – extending the sway of market exchange, in other words – involves nothing less 
than a Great Transformation in countries where, for many people, economic behavior is 
governed by the institutions of redistribution and/or reciprocity rather than (or in addition 
to) market exchange.57 
  
Derived from a deductive model, neoliberal policies from the outset are not great 
predictors of what they set forth to accomplish. In the case of Africa, experts across the 
board have illustrated how the adjustments actually moved Africa in a direction that 
“separates it further from the rest of the world,” giving us due reason to study African 
neoliberalism as a separate analytical category.58 While it is unclear whether or not 
African states have truly entered a post-Washington Consensus era, conditions for 
policymaking have changed. We can draw three conclusions from these two “waves” of 
neoliberal restructuring: First, throughout the post-colonial era, economic restructuring 
has not transformed or altered Africa’s role as a provider of raw materials to the global 
economy.59 While still exporting cash crops, now there is a quasi-privatized market for 
farmland.  Second, it is necessary to have a historically embedded conception of 
neoliberalism to begin to understand how related reforms remain imposed but also 
wielded by African state policymakers. Third, scholars have long discussed the effects of 
structural adjustment and neoliberalism in Africa and most accounts condemn these 
policies. While the current African “state” is itself an effect of neoliberal adjustments (as 
are trends in policymaking), scholars diverge in their analysis of how “strong” or “weak” 
the African state is while contributing different theories about the current pursuit of 
reforms. The next section will compare specific scholars’ accounts of why neoliberal 
policies are still pursued, recalling the externalist and agency approaches discussed 
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previously. Overall, how scholars interpret reforms in Africa will likely relate to their 
interpretation of elite politics in Africa. In analyzing why elites may pursue neoliberal 
reforms, I suggest that the “neopatrimonial approach” is most accurate – and that aid 
flows and conditionality have little impact on the decisions of elite policymakers.  
Competing Explanations for Neoliberal Reform 
Externalists 
 Scholars in the externalist cadre usually appropriate a “weak state” thesis to 
explain both the imposition of policies and African dependency on foreign largesse. 
Shadrack W. Nasang’o, while reviewing four decades of political and economic liberal 
reforms across African states, concludes that dictatorship has left the political realm for 
the economic realm, and equates new forms of authoritarian economism with external 
encumbrance. While states require more loans and debt rescheduling, IFIs use their 
“potent (financial) wherewithal to force their shock therapy measures on unwilling but 
vulnerable states.”60  His argument draws heavily from international agreements made in 
the 1990s on the rights of MNCs and banks, the entrenchment of trade liberalization 
norms in the WTO, and figures of debt and unemployment on the African continent. 
Similarly, Frank K. Matanga also emphasizes the African state’s reduced capacity to 
govern; state leaders must continually acquiesce to adjustment conditions to contain their 
debt crises. However, Matanga focuses his somewhat vague analysis on the growth of 
NGO activity – organizations that have increasingly taken over basic social service 
provision -  and suggests that where greater numbers of NGOs are operating in a state, 
their activities are a reflection of weak state capacity to meet the basic needs of its 
people.61 Matanga challenges the popular perception that NGOs are “good”, autonomous, 
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accountable, and representative of civil society; instead, he surmises that NGOs are but 
an appendage of externally imposed anti-state development programs.62 Ferguson 
likewise commented on the range of NGOs funded by Western agencies to sponsor 
neoliberal interventions and bypass uncooperative governments, revealing that NGOS 
may be less “non-governmental” than they would like to let off.63 However, the roles of 
NGOs vary substantially and it would be misleading to group them together with other 
external institutions such as the World Bank. 
A similar “weak state thesis” was advanced by Gyimah-Brempong and Asiedu to 
explain state policymaking in response to the declining flow of external aid, while 
making a case for the positive effects of investment liberalization on employment and 
FDI.64 Because net development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa had fallen by 41% 
between 1990 and 2001, financially unstable governments are purportedly turning to 
foreign investment (and capital account liberalization) to fill the “resource gap” left by 
aid organizations pulling out.65 Though their explanation is seemingly logical and 
compelling (certainly worth testing), the trend upon which their analysis rests is obsolete 
and not entirely useful today. According to the OECD, official development aid (ODA) 
to sub-Saharan Africa actually surpassed historic records in 2010 - $26.5 billion.66 The 
figure in 1990 was only $17 billion. Furthermore, while Nasang’o and Matanga’s 
analyses are historically grounded, they do not draw from current trends, case studies, or 
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methodological work. Moreover, Nasang’o exaggerates the democratic gains made; many 
states have slipped back into one-party rule following multi-party elections.   
 To dispute the “weak state” thesis, Lauren MacLean’s comparative work on 
patterns of non-state social welfare provision in West Africa compares the growth and 
spread of informal reciprocity networks in Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire.67 Her findings 
suggest that the instance of neoliberal state retrenchment following structural adjustment 
led many scholars to overemphasize the growth of informal networks of reciprocity in the 
alleged “vacuum” left by the state; in many local areas, less and less people are actually 
participating in these voluntary associations. Her analysis challenges the portrayal of the 
retrenched African state as “weak” or “failing” by demonstrating how firstly, informal 
institutions often interact with the state and secondly, states have shifted policies to re-
extend control into rural areas. She concludes that it is crucial to identify each state’s 
idiosyncratic trajectory of social and economic policies to better grasp the variant 
experiences of state power at the local level. MacLean never suggests external imposition 
of policies, but instead highlights formal and informal linkages – how states will use 
policies to “shape the composition of the new groups of winners and losers and how they 
come together to change the unwritten rules of the game.”68 Matching up, Matanga and 
Nasang’o’s “weak state” approach is insufficient to describe how African states use 
policies to regain control over non-state reciprocity networks.  
Agency theorists and the neo-patrimonial thesis 
 MacLean’s insights lead smoothly into the less subtle “agency” camp – in 
particular Taylor, Soderbaum, and Keen. In response to Matanga’s claim – that African 
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state leaders have been forced in desperation to sacrifice economic growth for political 
survival – these scholars would claim that ruling parties are not necessarily victims but 
active agents pursuing one-party rule and skirting on development functions. Both Taylor 
and Soderbaum attempted to explain why African governments were pursuing 
regionalism or regional governance under the neoliberal umbrella. Soderbaum 
distinguishes between three types of regional governance strategies (separate political 
interests, effectively) and how these different political goals qua types of governance 
overlap, in the same manner that African political authority is shaped at the state, 
regional, and global levels.69 Regional projects, he concludes, serve interests of the 
powerful and wealthy at multiple levels but may also be driven by a lack of resources left 
for African ruling elites to plunder within their own national economies.70 In this way, he 
nearly accepts the “weak state thesis”, but under the separate pretense of greater agency 
on the part of elites. Taylor, on the other hand, takes a less nuanced approach. He firmly 
begins his analysis by stating that African elites are the major causes of social and 
economic detriment on the continent, though they may often try to depict themselves as 
victims of adjustment, colonialism, or other externally-driven factors.71 Using 
Millennium Development Goals and degree of aid conditionality as a reference point for 
his argument, Taylor asserts that ruling elites exploit neoliberal policies for political 
advantage. 
 However, in line with Soderbaum’s argument, Taylor also posits that because 
elites perceive their national functions have eroded, they often look to regional 
expansion, identity, and complementary benefits from regionalism. Overall, though he 
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mentions South Africa as having a major influence on Mozambican economic policy with 
regards to regionalism and opening trade corridors, he ultimately concedes that these 
developments are all policy choices relating to “embedded neoliberal strategies of 
accumulation.”72 This stance is not unfamiliar in other scholarship. David Keen, 
perplexed by the resumption of neoliberal reforms following Sierra Leone’s civil war (a 
conflict fed in part by liberalization policies), suggested that the country’s so-called 
compliance to post-war restructuring – as guided by IFIs – was actually posturing on the 
part of elites. Drawing on the work of Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, he explains 
the move to reform with their concept “politics of the mirror”, where aid partners and 
IFIs are placated by elites who give the impression or appearance of reform, but instead 
devote financial resources to private accumulation and violent preservation of power.73  
 Chabal’s theory lies very close to the heart of the “neo-patrimonial” thesis, which 
grew popular in the late 1990s, holding sway among many scholars of African politics, 
while even oddly featuring “extensively and casually” in discussions conducted by IFIs, 
donor agencies, NGOs, and think tanks.74 The basic premise is that state politics and the 
current state of African affairs can be explained by groups of elites competing with each 
other for political dominance through vertical clientelist networks.75 Rather than 
inhibiting this form of politics, liberal and neoliberal transitions are known to enhance 
this behavior, even as adjustment policies and conditional aid are intended instead to 
dispel most government intervention and corruption. In contrast to the pre-adjustment 
developmental state, the neo-patrimonial African state is anti-developmental, predatory, 
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colludes with business elites, and privatizes public resources for the personal enrichment 
of the party-state apparatus.76 Jean-Francois Bayart helped to diffuse this line of 
scholarship with his seminal work “Africa in the world: a history of extraversion”, 
published in 2010.77 In this astute work, Bayart draws on both the history of the colonial 
era and the postcolonial era to claim that most new research on the African state points to 
the African elites’ active role in maintaining conditions of dependency. They do so 
specifically through a strategy of extraversion, wherein elites shift their ideological 
orientations and policies to maintain a dependent relationship with the external 
environment, which simultaneously affords them opportunities to create and capture 
rent.78  
The neo-patrimonial African regime was then widely viewed as institutionalized, 
specific to African states, and began to take on an ambiguous air of incurable pathology 
and totality. Critics have tried to move away from such generalizations, which often 
obscure the contrasting ways in which rulers establish legitimate authority and 
compliance from their citizens (not only along rent-seeking, clientelist lines) and how 
highly developed states in the Western world arguably share many of these so-called 
“African exceptionalist” patron-client characteristics.79 Slapping a singular regime type 
across all African states does injustice to heterogeneous processes of state formation, the 
study of regimes (where does neopatrimonial become authoritarian?), our insights about 
how state reproduce themselves - a constant and fluid process that rearranges “public”, 
“private”, and systems of reciprocity and exchange – and offers few solutions. 
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Nevertheless, it’s a powerful paradigm to use for examining current trends in neoliberal 
reforms and does not, like many neocolonial adherents, omit the complex nature of 
global, state, and local interactions that complicate notions of a one-way street of 
influence and exploitation from former colonial powers to postcolonial states.  
Pioneering paradigms 
 Externalists and neo-patrimonialists no longer have ascendency; one could say 
that each approach has enjoyed its height. Other scholars have offered equivalently sharp 
explanations. But new approaches, while casting an intricate depth to our understanding 
of African neoliberalism and policymaking, sacrifice parsimony and are more difficult to 
test methodologically. The first group uses Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to describe 
how neoliberal policymaking has become engrained, driven by external and internal 
discursive practices. In this vein, Richard Peet attributes the adoption of neoliberal 
reforms and resonance in South Africa to what he calls the “colonization of discourse” by 
Western policy missionaries, who interact with and train South Africa’s academic-
institutional-media (AIM) complex.80 As South Africa switched from pursuing growth 
through redistribution to a policy of redistribution through growth under the neoliberal 
program GEAR, Peet traces this switch through the ANC’s discursive history ending with 
its entanglement with the globally hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism 
has become monolithic in that it enjoys “intensive regulatory power” and symbolic 
wherewithal in its “persuasive political ideals.”81 His argument, however compelling, 
seems to boil down to a sophisticated version of the “externalist approach” – his 
conclusion is laden with remarks about the IMF and World Bank’s “stabilization” loaning 
to South Africa and the influence of global capital in shaping domestic business 
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interests.82 Similarly, Alison Ayers studies neoliberal democratization under the 
Gramscian notion of “active consent”, first imposed but then actively internalized on the 
part of “subaltern groups” in African states.83 Graham Harrison, detailing at great length 
the multiple ways in which neoliberalism has been defined, points to how the economistic 
core of neoliberalism is now firmly integrated into African development policy and is 
entrenched as a continuous project to spread free-market relations across society in a 
statist fashion.84 In essence, it reminds of us of right-wing arguments about “self-
governance”, rational decision-making on the part of autonomous individuals, and 
voluntary social service networks filling in the gaps where the state should supposedly 
withdraw. So internalized is this framework that it has leapt into all policy spheres. 
Harrison goes further: 
The result of all this is that a profusion of development policy innovations has 
emerged on the base of a consolidated institutional continuity largely defined by 
a nexus of institutions, ideas, and personal relationships between the IFIs, donors 
and debtor states. Thus the short history of neoliberalism in Africa is one of 
expanding and increasingly ‘social’ remit and the development of a cluster of 
agencies that advocate the neoliberal agenda – largely external but also based 
within African states themselves, and especially presidencies, ministries of 
finance, and central banks.85 
 
Institutional continuity is a convincing paradigm, especially if we were to analyze the 
rhetoric and reports released by officials and measure the extent that ruling parties 
generate this discourse internally.  Adesina follows Harrison’s lead. He writes that 
between 1980 and 2000, the neoliberal policy regimes were first imposed and directed by 
donor communities. However, now the level of intrusiveness is dependent on “the 
ideological affinity between local state-agents and external policy merchants, and the 
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fiscal vulnerability of the client state.”86 When analyzing the formation and “African 
ownership” of NEPAD in another article, Adesina also invokes neoliberal hegemony at 
the policymaking level and adds that because structural adjustment altered the class bases 
of African regimes and former movements, a bourgeois class emerged.87 It is in the 
interest of the petty bourgeois to maintain its preponderance through the use of neoliberal 
policymaking and its connections with external business and political networks.  
 The “internalization approach” has another facet that emphasizes the role of 
technocrats in shaping policy. Jeffrey Chwieroth examined why governments in 
emerging markets were willing to liberalize capital controls, arguing that “one critical 
mechanism shaping policy decisions is the formation of a coherent team of neoliberal 
economists”.88 Even while financial intermediaries may disagree on the possible effects 
of liberalization, policymakers adhering to the “credibility model” may be swayed by 
liberalization to signal to foreign investors, creditors, and donors of the government’s 
creditworthiness and commitment to a policy orientation.89 These interests, mixed with 
political goals, make officials from a coherent party likely to appoint neoliberal 
economists. Following an “epistemic communities” approach and employing sweeping 
quantitative methods, Chwieroth highlights the pivotal role that a technocratic team of 
economists can play by diffusing policies and ideas to ruling parties where the salience of 
ideas depend on whether or not they complement political interests. It is incredibly 
insightful for understanding how policymakers come to understand what their interests 
are, and this may involve the lurking influence of external actors. Harrison also referred 
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to the shift of neoliberal cabals from external entities to bases within the state – 
presidencies, ministries of finance, and central banks.90 Bram Buscher, in his analysis of 
conservation and tourist projects in Southern Africa came to similar conclusions: elites 
will shape debates about policy in market terms to avoid political stigma attached to 
“redistribution” or “inequality” – instead referring to the infallible, scientific expertise of 
technocrats.91 
James Ferguson has written extensively about Africa within a “neoliberal global 
order”, where membership in the world economy is less about seamless connection 
presupposed by certain meta-narratives, and more about status and privilege. To analyze 
neoliberal reforms in Africa, scholars must overhaul the opposition between the 
neoliberal state and the Keynesian welfare state, as both do little to account for the 
majority of Africans that are not formal wage laborers and operate in the informal sector 
or the “hard-to-categorize urban improvisers at society’s margins.”92 New configurations 
of government power, where the state occupies certain functions and NGOs take over 
other crucial functions erodes traditional conceptions of governance as centralized within 
state institutions (it can be both “weak” and “strong” simultaneously). Perhaps the most 
crucial point that Ferguson makes, over and against a strict neo-patrimonial account, is 
that in regards to social policy and poverty, the government does not simply ignore these 
issues or leaves it to the “free market”, but may instead have grown accustomed to and 
relies upon the welfare interventions of NGOs and philanthropic organizations.93  A truly 
market-based governance. Moreover, in accordance with Opoku’s work, a neo-
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patrimonial state would certainly not adopt reforms that would create an autonomous 
capitalist class; a group accumulating wealth independent of the state would prove 
threatening to the ruling party.94 Only when there is a strong state-business alliance 
would the neo-patrimonial thesis hold water where economic reforms, ceding control and 
autonomy to a business class, are concerned. 
Theories on neoliberalism as they relate more to trends in elite policymaking and 
less to the well-worn discussion of the effects of these policies show a fusion rather than 
a split between externalist and neopatrimonial analyses. Recent conclusions impart the 
picture of global forces and the African state interacting in a way altogether different 
from the structural adjustment era. The African state uses neoliberalism in different ways 
-  for productive and counterproductive ends - disciplined (also to varying degrees) by an 
influential transnational framework. When analyzing Mozambique’s neoliberal 
governmentality, I will attempt to analyze reforms related to commercial agricultural 
investments within both an externalist framework and a neo-patrimonial framework, 
while also noting how reforms are socially mediated within Frelimo’s ranks and require 
an understanding of the party’s relationship with the domestic business class. 
 
Methods 
 Why do African elites choose neoliberal development policies?  Also, do elites 
pursue  them because they are dependent on external forces (e.g. IMF, World Bank, 
bilateral aid donors from former colonial states)? Or do they choose them because the 
investments are easy to control and distribute rents to the ruling party to maintain regime 
stability and a patron-client system? The instance of “land grabbing” provides new terrain 
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for testing the degree of autonomy that African policymakers enjoy and the extent to 
which a neoliberal governmentality is tied to conditions of dependency. In Mozambique, 
I will first employ process tracing to illustrate how three waves of liberal reforms brought 
Frelimo from a Stalinist-Leninist state through multi-party democracy and back to one-
party rule under the auspices of Western donors and international financial organizations. 
I hypothesize that foreign influence declined since the end of the Cold War and civil war 
in Mozambique, and expect to see the ruling party make decisions either against full 
liberalization or for strictly political ends. Second, I will analyze current reforms to the 
Land Law as well as the process through which the government appropriates land and 
approves foreign leases, relating these insights to the neo-patrimonial hypothesis. I would 
expect to see local and high-level elites using these policies to award themselves land and 
not fully privatizing land, as bilateral donors have pushed for. Third, I will test the 
externalist approach by comparing trends in aid/loans, conditionality, extent of 
liberalization using rankings from “Doing Business”, corruption rankings, and reports on 
the relationship between the ruling party and domestic capitalist class. Based on these 
findings and the commentary of scholars reporting on aid and Mozambique, I would 
expect conditionality to be lax, corruption rankings to be high, rankings in “Doing 
Business” to be low, and a strong connection between the ruling party and business class. 
 
“Orthodoxy” to “reform”: post-revolutionary Mozambique 
 Liberal reforms, both political and economic, have appeared in fits and bursts 
throughout Frelimo’s rule after independence in 1975. But we can encompass the 
adjustments within three identifiable waves: membership in the IMF and World Bank in 
1984 (structural adjustment), multiparty elections in 1994 and neoliberal reforms in the 
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late 1990s, and the current wave of neoliberal practices. But most curious in this recent 
junction is the simultaneous, systematic reversal of political liberalization and the more 
informal character of neoliberal reforms. Abandoning – however discretely – Frelimo’s 
commitment to electoral democracy by enacting stringent regulations on the participation 
of smaller opposition parties, the ruling party seems intent to re-blur state and party 
lines.95 Frelimo’s historic transfiguration was at first guided by necessity and dependency 
on foreign donors and IFIs, in line with the externalist thesis. In the 1990s, it is clear that 
the ruling party challenges external influences to its policymaking. Frelimo’s  trajectory 
as a revolutionary movement and ruling party, first amenable to and later reaping benefits 
from liberal reforms, will be detailed in this section to demonstrate that for Frelimo’s 
political survival in the 1980s and 1990s, liberal reform was a sine qua non. Frelimo’s 
initial experience with liberalization laid the foundations for and offer important insights 
into current neoliberal reforms, where there is continuity (e.g. steady relationships with 
bilateral donors) and also discontinuity. Altogether, the blatant objective underlying the 
character of the latter two reform periods is consistent with my thesis: Frelimo pivots its 
position on policymaking to secure the survival and superiority of the party. Its tight 
relationship with a capitalist/entrepreneurial class enables it to pursue reforms without 
risking threats to its power base.   
 
Figure 1.0: Frelimo & Three Waves of Liberalization in Mozambique 
socialist orthodoxy -> Wave 1: economic reform  -> Wave 2: political reform  -> Wave 3:  neoliberal reform 
(one party rule)             (multiparty rule)          (one party rule –  
             reversal of democratic reform) 
     
 1975-1984      1980s-on  1990s and early 2000s            NOW 
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Whither liberation or revolution? 
After the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, an instrumental leader during 
Frelimo’s emergence in the 1960s, the younger “revolutionary” faction ignited a decisive 
ideological shift within the liberation front. As the anti-colonial struggle against the 
Portuguese intensified, the “anti-revolutionary wing” within the core leadership of the 
movement was abruptly subordinated to an explicitly Marxist-Leninist agenda.96 
Educated refugees returning from Tanzania sought to articulate a program that was not 
limited to mere political revolution and independence, but one that encompassed greater 
socioeconomic transformations for the country. Frelimo’s “newly liberated zones” in the 
North served as experimental rehearsals for practicing desired forms of production – 
involving collectivist pilot projects, health clinics, and schools.97 These projects 
broadened Frelimo’s support base to include peasants, workers, chiefs, and elites. But 
Frelimo mistakenly confused the enthusiasm and anti-imperialism of the movement’s 
supporters with consensus on its revolutionary agenda. Certain elements of centralized 
planning were widely accepted during the advent of the revolution. However, due to a 
variety of grievances and crises, support for the socialist regime deteriorated during its 
first decade of rule. Foreign and domestic hostility toward the increasingly isolated one-
party vanguard state would conclusively, combined with poor economic conditions and 
drought, necessitate the first wave of liberal reforms.   
 
Destabilization era 
Widespread disease, poverty, a pronounced lack of education, racial/ethnic 
cleavages, and wartime debt were major and widely noted obstacles for Frelimo. 
Moreover, to forge national unity amidst ethnic and regional particularism was a chore, 
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made more tedious by resentment to southern dominance in Frelimo’s already privileged 
minority leadership.98 And in 1975, 80% of the population lived in rural poor areas and 
90% were illiterate.99 With meager resources and few personnel, Frelimo struggled to 
extend its presence and basic services to each region. This made urban areas easier to 
manage but left rural communities – the majority – neglected (as mentioned above). The 
immediate exodus of 51,000 Portuguese people – that is, most of the skilled labor, 
managerial capacity, and economic advisors – also left the economy in shambles.100 Yet 
these economic troubles were not, as Peter Utting suggests, the sole impetus for adopting 
pragmatic liberal reforms.101 As the Third Party Congress sought rapid industrialization, 
modernization, and an expanded role of the state in all sectors – it largely imported 
foreign models of social and agricultural organization that did not resonate with most 
Mozambicans.102  
Seeds of resentment sprung from unpopular social engineering schemes that 
uprooted rural populations and negatively shaped their perceptions toward socialism. 
Initially, grievances erupted when religious and oppositional groups were outlawed and 
party leaders from northern and central regions faced expulsion. But Frelimo went even 
further. Mondlane and his followers viewed Marxism as the proper antithesis of anti-
colonialism and traditional African practices.103 Following independence, Frelimo 
leadership thus dismantled and abolished these deeply-instilled traditional hierarchies. 
Archambault, in his review, noted that the forced demise of chiefly rule (more than any 
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other factor) drove scores of peasants to support the brutal insurgent campaign of 
Renamo.104 Additionally, these peasants were forced into a collectivized agricultural 
system involving poorly managed and resource-strapped state-farms, which also had little 
relation to previous ways in which production was socially organized.105 On the one 
hand, nationalization of land in 1976 was applauded because it did not initially disrupt 
peasants’ occupation of ancestral lands or the plots they used productively.  On the other 
hand, attempts to organize peasants into collectivized, state farming schemes were met 
with noncompliance and defection to Renamo.106 Though the peasantry had been the 
backbone of support for Frelimo’s armed struggle, services and food staples were 
extended almost exclusively to urban classes, thus marginalizing rural communities. 
Frelimo was, throughout the first decade of rule, preoccupied with creating an urban 
working class and industrial sector as well as directing most agricultural investment into 
the large, capital-intensive state farms (former colonial farms) and leaving the smaller 
semi-mechanized collectives cash-strapped (Bowen 1993; O’Laughlin 1995). Though the 
colonial administration’s legacies of forced labor and cash cropping were abolished, 
Frelimo’s radical discontinuity with prevailing systems of social organization and 
production in the countryside would fuel insurgency and later, massive dislocation. 
Rural grievances would prove ample for the foreign-backed Renamo to launch a 
violent campaign against the ruling Marxist-Leninist party. Other alienated groups in 
peri-urban or urban areas joined too, as social mobility became increasingly restricted to 
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Frelimo party members. The sixteen-year-long civil war that ensued was fueled by the 
white minority governments of South Africa and Rhodesia and drained over 35% of 
Frelimo’s already dwindling resources.107 Nation-building took a backseat and the ruling 
party had to seriously reconsider its agenda as rebels moved swiftly through the Manica 
and Sofala provinces and closed in around the southern capital. Renamo posed a powerful 
threat; its movement defended traditional leadership, religious beliefs of rural and non-
southern communities, and sought to paint Frelimo’s socialist system as inherently hostile 
to African society.108 However, this period of destabilization (1977-1989) would not 
prove entirely ruinous for Frelimo – the party would endure under the auspices of 
Western institutions and assistance. 
First Wave of Reform: the 1980s 
When a host of domestic grievances became infused with external aggression, the 
costly and bloody conflict that followed would force Frelimo to make its first liberal 
shifts. Frelimo was desperate for funds and assistance: over a 5-year period, Mozambique 
ran a trade deficit of over $40 million and a 17% decline in GNP.109 Hence, the party was 
compelled to join the World Bank and IMF in 1983, and under that institutional guidance 
and pressure would later launch its IMF-sponsored PRE or Programa de Reabilitação 
Económica in 1987.110 Austerity measures implemented during this phase of the civil war 
resulted in lower wages, a devalued currency, and greater economic downturn, even as 
aid and loans flowed in.111 An infamous bundle of policies - “structural adjustment.” 
SAPs were applied haphazardly and without critical reserve across the developing world, 
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reflecting the World Bank’s early stance in the 1980s – that African developmental woes 
are attributable to over-extended states and illiberal economic policies.112 Obviously, this 
wasn’t necessarily the case for Mozambique. Where Frelimo had made impressive gains 
in health and education before the war, during the mid-1980s, 35% of government 
spending was diverted to the conflict and social services became sorely underfunded.113 
Also, historical scrutiny suggests that the party reached out to the West for political and 
economic survival while caught in the throes of a nasty, foreign-backed civil war. During 
the late 1980s, with the pending dissolution of the USSR, Frelimo could no longer count 
on financial and arms support from the Communist bloc. 
An outline of the Fourth Party Congress’ reforms in 1983 largely centered on 
providing support to cooperatives, families, and private sectors, while reducing the large-
scale state farms. Bowen details the four primary policy changes – that of “regional 
prioritization, administrative decentralization, liberalization of commercial activity, and 
allocation of resources on the bass of economic pragmatism rather than ideology.”114 
Regional prioritization translated into directing more resources and credit to small scale 
farmers so to reverse the systematic neglect of rural populations and regain support for 
Frelimo. But policy is one thing and implementation another; combined with adjustment 
policies that deregulated markets and prices, major social and economic tolls hit rural and 
poor urban populations and new programs were hard-pressed to reach Renamo 
strongholds in the countryside. As aid pledges fell between 1987 and 1990, coinciding 
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with an official break with military assistance from Moscow, Frelimo was forced to 
negotiate with Renamo in direct talks to end the war in 1990.115 
Second and Third Waves 
Consistent with the neopatrimonial thesis that takes the African state in the post-
Cold War era as its focal point – that is, the state as embedded in social relations that 
span global and local spheres – democratic reforms would prove strategic for Frelimo to 
maintain its role as the dominant organization for political access and social mobility in 
Mozambique. At first glance, multiparty politics would appear to weaken the party 
apparatus, pursued not for survival but under the pervasive influence of external actors as 
a condition for the peace process. Nevertheless, when direct talks began between Frelimo 
and Renamo in July of 1990, the primary factors outlined by scholars to explain 
Frelimo’s acquiescence to multiparty elections were varied: vulnerability due to the 
party’s exclusivity and lack of presence across the central and northern provinces and its 
stalemate with Renamo (Sumich 683); chaos in the Soviet Union, which led to an official 
end to military and economic support to Frelimo in 1989-1990; and the need for 
legitimacy, authority, and power in the eyes of both the domestic population and 
international constituents. It follows that the new constitution adopted in 1990 would 
briefly break the state and party apart. As one-party rule dissolved and Marxist-Leninist 
principles were officially abandoned in the 5th Party Congress, Frelimo attempted to 
expand its membership and include religious leaders and business owners.116 Under the 
mantle of the 1990 multi-party constitution, party and state were briefly separated and 
compelled Frelimo to reorganize its support base – namely, shifting from a working 
class-peasant alliance to an alliance with the domestic capitalist class (Simpson 1993). 
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Various multinational corporations negotiated with the state for concessionary contract 
farming schemes (often with local companies) and South African capital and goods 
flooded the country.117 International donors, who had previously financed Frelimo’s 
conversion to a political party as a condition of the group’s full participation in the peace 
process, now pressured for privatization of land (Bowen 1992; Manning 2010; 
O’Laughlin 1995). 
This pressure, combined with postwar reconstruction, resettlement of rural 
groups, and coordination of agricultural production merged into a national land law 
debate spanning 1995 -1997, and resulted in the approval of Lei de Terras 19/97 - the 
new Land Law. Changes to issues involving land were few; the 1990 multi-party 
constitution that Frelimo adopted as a requirement of the peace settlement permitted the 
selling or mortgaging of land. All land and soil was to be controlled by the national 
government, which would in turn determine conditions of land use (Articles 35, 46-47). 
Assessing how the Land Law has been applied since it was passed shows discrepancies 
that call forth explanations from both the externalist and neo-patrimonial theses. Factions 
of Frelimo wavered between creating a new system of individual land titles and 
reinstalling a system of communal tenure under the oversight of district administrations 
(regulos).118 It is unclear which system would best spur smallholder production, though 
this was not the immediate concern for Frelimo. The latter route was finally chosen to re-
extend state-party control; that is, current district officials or regulos are usually loyal 
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elites placed by Frelimo that act seldom on the part of the communities they represent but 
are placed for surveillance and to ensure the implementation of the party’s agenda. For 
instance, in the case of foreign agricultural investments, district officials – in exchange 
for a facilitation fee - will often approve projects in spite of broader opposition within the 
community (dos Reis interview). A few South African ranchers, seeking only 1,000 ha in 
the Manica province along the Buzi River, were denied an allocation from district 
authorities until a friend of theirs had the provincial governor intervene on their behalf 
(McCarter interview). 
  Though the process was internationally commended for its transparency and 
democratic character, because the Land Law does not require local communities with 
“overriding” use-rights to request delimitation and receive a title (or DUAT) to their 
lands, investors must merely consult a village leader or district official, whose sole 
approval may secure the title or lease for the investor. Conversely, if more communities 
were formally registered – and approximately 16% are countrywide – their titles ensure 
that an interested investor must instead negotiate directly with the community whereby 
the investor would enter into a contract with the village and not the government (OI 
2011; JA/UNAC 2011). But according to Hanlon, between 1997 and 2002, no contracts 
had been proffered (2004). It is now clear that: both formal titles and use rights are 
transferable, but because each is distinguished by a different process and because 
transferring unregistered land use rights is conducted by local officials (not 
communities), control over lease negotiations and transfers has been successfully 
centralized within Frelimo’s internal structures (McCarter interview). Therefore, Frelimo 
party elites may benefit from the widespread ignorance and lack of community DUAT 
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registration. The World Bank and IMF direct these concerns toward the behavior of 
MNCs and not necessarily the full implementation and regulation of government policies 
that would otherwise protect communities. It is no wonder that small-scale agricultural 
production cannot grow under such neglect and restraint, and it should neither be 
surprising that family farming is dominant – associations and cooperatives that register 
must pay taxes on the land, and many can’t afford to. What little incentive families do 
have to organize on a larger scale to supply more to local markets is further impeded by 
the effect of food aid on prices for local farmers.119 As foreign investors enjoy a package 
of tax-free benefits, no fees on imported equipment, and a 50-year lease, while swept 
along by elites posing as representatives at the district level, the growth of this informal 
market for land ineluctably reveals what Lunstrum calls a “seemingly contradictory type 
of neoliberal state space” (2008; Fairbairn 2011; Meikle interview).  
Evaluating the Land Law  
The Land Law, seemingly diffuse with the aim to strike a balance between 
encouraging investment and protecting peasants’ rights and access land, has proved less 
than impartial. Though no interviewees, when asked, had heard of any land conflicts and 
were not troubled by foreign leases, they admitted that smallholders were systematically 
marginalized by a registration process whose procedures had become more complicated, 
if they were even familiar with the process.120  And this tweaking, coupled with virtually 
nonexistent access to loans from the central banks, has made it impossible for many to 
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move beyond subsistence farming. Vegetable sellers (many who sell produce from South 
Africa) spoke enthusiastically of working on commercial farms in the face of 23-25% 
loans interest rates and because funding for small/medium-scale farms is widely believed 
to be funneled to Frelimo party members (Meikle interview). Approval for new projects 
has been streamlined in recent years after much of the previous red tape has since been 
cleared. Fortunately, and in contrast to many claims made by NGOs and other “neo-
colonial” adherents, they are required to conduct consultations and provide health 
centers, schools, and wells, but the government does not provide the personnel for those 
services (dos Reis interview; McCarter interview). Moreover, officials speak of the need 
for special treatment and incentives for large-scale investors and for infrastructural work 
to be done only so that skilled farmers from South Africa and Zimbabwe will also agree 
to farm in Mozambique, while mentioning nothing about strategies to increase incentives 
for smallholders (Xavier interview).  
Over 2.67 million hectares of land were either transferred or in negotiation by 
2009, or 405 documented projects in total (Deininger et al 2010). Many more project 
proposals are awaiting approval, following the current Agricultural Zoning Process 
(2009-2011) to revalue vast swathes of public land, during which time a freeze of large-
scale investments has been imposed. Many of these leases are granted to Mozambican 
companies and investors, but the land awarded, while conveniently located near cities, 
ports, and crucial infrastructure is often transferred by party elites with DUATs to the 
prime real estate in question (McCarter interview). After the uproar at the Fifth Party 
Congress’ removal of personal investment and accumulation restrictions for party 
members in 1989, now market-inspired policies newly justify removing restrictions and 
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enable elites to expropriate land and seek new avenues for personal enrichment, while 
making it seem “foreign-driven”. Having previously taken advantage of cheap land by 
registering their own claims to DUATs, party elites will often sit on valuable land and 
negotiate leases with investors themselves. South African investors have also bought land 
with similar motivations, and attempted to sell parcels at inflated prices – transferring 
money and documents outside of the government framework entirely (McCarter 
interview; Fairbairn 2011). Luckily, Frelimo has been clamping down on this activity and 
forcing companies out where they do not meet agreed timeframes for developing the 
land.121 Nevertheless, are these processes better explained by the externalist approach or 
the neo-patrimonial approach? The latter seems to represent (to a more accurate degree) 
the balance of internal and external influences on reforms – especially how they are 
carried out.  
The current situation in Mozambique is most precarious. While NGOs seem to be 
organizing in opposition to Frelimo’s investment policies, UNAC directors are 
nevertheless engaged with officials to negotiate a new land law and seem to think of 
Frelimo as the only channel for changing policies (dos Reis interview). They work 
exhaustively to inform peasants of the registration process and even assist communities in 
claiming a DUAT. Under the CEAPGRI program, Mozambican banks are now working 
with foreign commercial banks to install a system of guarantees so that a long-term 
investment fund can be made available to commercial farmers, though there is still no 
“Land Bank” for smaller farmers absent the efforts of NGOs like TechnoServe (Xavier 
interview). Furthermore, beyond food, clothing, and oil subsidies (which the government 
                                                      
121
 Such was the case with the British biofuels investment, under PROCANA, which had leased 30,000 
hectares in the Gaza province, but was not keeping pace with its 5-year plan. The government of 
Mozambique cancelled the deal in December 2009. 
 51 
has been trying to remove), there is no program for the 20-30% of city dwellers that also 
engage in agriculture as a principle activity (dos Reis interview).  When the question of 
smallholders and subsistence farmers is brought up, solutions are spoken of in terms of 
encouraging outgrower schemes or cooperation amongst farmers. Under the neoliberal 
framework, programs, funding, and services for small farmers are delegated to other 
organizations, creating a configuration of governance where certain responsibilities are 
no longer part of Frelimo’s agenda. Lastly, where privilege has been reorganized in terms 
of credit access for foreign investors or wealthy domestic investors, the accompanying 
reorganization of space and land is also identifiable. The Zoning Process, mean to “better 
orient” investors by creating a more detailed map of the land in fertile provinces by 
increasing the scale of the map four-fold, will assess and redefine land in terms of 
commercial use (Xavier 2011). We have yet to see the full implications of this 
profoundly neoliberal governmentality, as it is being played out in Mozambique’s 
courting of foreign investors today. However, it is clear that pointing only or mostly to 
external influences (investors, World Bank, IMF, and donors), who allegedly promote 
full democratic and economic liberalization and yet do nothing to rescind aid or loans 
when Frelimo does not meet these conditions, cannot explain why investments and the 
Land Law have obviously aided the party and its patron-client networks more than 
investors. It is also unclear whether or not SAPs succeeded in “rolling back the state” in 
Mozambique, besides eroding its sovereignty through enforcement of fiscal restrictions 
and other arbitrary controls on state policymaking.122 Indeed, as Frelimo agreed to adopt 
liberal reforms in exchange for external funding, this served paradoxically to “roll out” 
state power or entrench its control over access to resources.  
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Assessing the externalist approach to elite policymaking 
 This paper previously explored current trends in foreign agricultural investment in 
Africa (dubbed “land grabbing”) and their necessary association with neoliberal reforms 
pursued by African states to encourage the inflow of foreign capital. Using process 
tracing to detail the factors driving economic and political liberalization in Mozambique, 
it is clear that across the identifiable “three waves” of reform, the actors and forces that 
have historically influenced the implementation of neoliberal reforms have changed and 
are clearly more nuanced in the current era, as the neo-patrimonial thesis would suggest.  
For instance, changes to the Land Law and the ubiquitously informal process by which 
foreign investors are allocated land and receive privileged access to credit through local 
elites suggest that a purely “externalist” approach may be insufficient to capture the 
constellations of power and influence involved in “land grabbing” and neoliberal reform. 
State-sponsored contradictions, partial reforms, and informal practices taken by ruling 
elites to allocate land reveal a complicated portrait of reforms to land and investment 
policies as mediated by forces both “inside” and “outside” the state. Thus, in our 
investigation of the forces that shape policymaking/reform in Africa, a more robust 
understanding of the African state and governance is required. This has been described at 
great length in current literature on neoliberalism. The two approaches used 
predominantly in Africanist literature give disparate pictures, and it is my intent to test 
the externalist approach in this section.  
I. The Externalist Approach 
 Neoliberal reforms associated with foreign agricultural investments are not 
pursued; they are imposed on African states via aid and loan conditionality. If this 
explanation remains rigorous today, we would expect to see a higher degree of aid 
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conditionality, penalties, and aid flows that would change according to the extent of 
democratic and economic liberalization. Land and credit access would predominantly 
favor foreign investors. Conditions for liberalization will show continuity between the era 
of adjustment and current trends in reform.  
Independent variables 
1. Degree of fiscal weakness of the state, measured by changes in the proportion 
of annual state expenditure provided by aid and changes in GDP/GNI 
2. Degree of conditionality attached to aid and the presence/absence of penalties 
when a state fails to meet requirements for political and economic 
liberalization 
3. Degree that changes to aid flows match changes in economic and political 
liberalization 
Results 
 At first glance, the externalist hypothesis is compelling because Mozambique is 
among the most dependent of the “donor darlings”, sporting a ratio of aid to GNI that is 
almost four times the average for sub-Saharan Africa.123 Using data gathered from the 
OECD on General Budget Support and Total Aid in Mozambique, it is evident that when 
the % of aid as a proportion of GNI (or gross national income) increases, this in turn 
reflects the fiscal weakness of the state. Simply stated, a state that maintains a stable level 
of GDP growth - or shows increases in GDP relative to aid inflows - would be somewhat 
more fiscally “strong” as aid is intended to spur sustained economic growth in developing 
states with lower GDPs.  A state that is more fiscally weak, under the externalist thesis, is 
beholden to more foreign influence in policymaking.  
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As this graph124 shows, the % of official development aid as a proportion of 
Mozambique’s GNI has been decreasing, not because aid flows have decreased, but 
because Mozambique’s GDP has increased exponentially in recent years. Compare $4.2 
billion in 2000 to $9.6 billion in 2010.125 This graph can be misleading: although net 
flows of aid actually increased from approximately $60 million to about $90 million (per 
year) between 2004 and 2011, because Mozambique’s GDP has grown and foreign 
investment has increased dramatically, the state is less “fiscally weak” than ever 
before.126 This does not necessarily indicate that the government of Mozambique has 
more autonomy in policymaking (though there is more output unrelated to aid), but that 
                                                      
124
 The spike in 2002 reflects debt as well as a surge in aid related to HIV/AIDS initiatives. Data for this 
graph was gathered from three sources: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/47/37420133.pdf; 
http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/mozambique/net-oda-received; and the UNDP’s “Mozambique: Quick 
Facts – Economic and Policy Analysis Unit” March 2011. 
125




 Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Development Co-operation Report, 










ODA as % of GNI
 55 
the externalist approach, citing fiscal weakness, loses ground to recent trends. Indeed, 
GDP growth in Mozambique has been increasing between 6-9% since 2001.127 
Mozambique remains fiscally weak and heavily dependent on aid, but this does not 
necessarily translate into no control or sovereignty in policymaking. 
 Variables related to aid in Africa require deeper inspection, as the aggregate 
yearly flows of official development assistance are employed at the country-level in most 
scholarly work, while fewer scholars analyze aid allocated toward specific local projects 
at the sub-national level. However, empirical investigations into the more sophisticated 
data on aid projects still seem to conclude that because the bulk of aid remains dispersed 
mostly through capital cities and through the auspices of the national government, it 
remains merely a form of rent that empowers the ruling party. This literature was 
reflected in Findley and Powell’s analysis, in which they created a detailed map of all aid 
projects across 24 African states, where geographical coordinates (varying by size and 
shade depending on the amount of money involved) were assigned for each project.  Of 
all the states, Mozambique was the largest recipient of aid between 1989 and 2008, 
totaling $28.4 billion.128 And though there are many smaller aid projects throughout the 
entire country, a greater portion of aid projects are concentrated in the southern province 
near Maputo and in the second largest city Beira. What does this mean for the externalist 
thesis? If more aid is directed at specific and dispersed projects, foreign donors have 
more control over how it is spent. Yet Carrie Manning’s most recent analysis of 
Mozambique shows that trends involving donor support for specific projects has actually 
decreased since 1992 and has been redirected towards national budgets, giving the 




 See figure 1 in Michael G. Findley & Josh Powell (2011), “The localized geography of foreign aid: a 
new dataset and application to violent armed conflict,” in World Development, 39(11): 1995-2009. 
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government of Mozambique more freedom and flexibility in determining how the money 
is spent – and thus reducing donors’ ability to influence elite behavior.129 Interestingly 
enough, Manning and Malbrough argue elsewhere that the role of donors is indispensable 
in immediate post-conflict states and in peace-building, but that it is unclear how 
efficacious conditional aid can prove later, especially in meeting development goals set 
by donors.130 This isn’t too surprising, given that Findley and Powell’s article focuses on 
aid flows during years of conflict, specifically 1989-1991 in Mozambique.  
 We cannot dismiss the externalist thesis entirely because aid flows do remain 
high. How has conditionality changed? There are a few problems with conceptualizing 
aid conditionality. From the 1990s onward, “political conditionality” and democratic 
reforms replaced economic reforms as the more stringent requirements for continued 
assistance under the Post-Washington Consensus.131  But various studies conclude that 
aid flows are known to fluctuate due to concerns not with the well-being of the economy 
in question or good governance per se but with the partisan-stance of the ruling party and 
its relationship with the foreign policy or geopolitical interests of donors (Gounder & Sen 
1999; Cachel-Cordo & Craig 1997). Similarly, Randall Stone’s analysis concludes that 
conditionality may be more or less political – that is, US aid will differ in its incentives, 
principles, conditions, and priorities from German or British aid.132 Thus economic 
assistance policies may often shift depending on the party in power and domestic political 
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issues, as was shown in the two-game analysis of aid flows and policy by Rick Travis.133 
However (and perhaps luckily enough in this case), Mozambique has been under the rule 
of one party since independence. Consistent rule by one-party somewhat controls for 
variation in aid that could be ascribed to changes in party rule and power. Its medley of 
donors, on the other hand, is a bit more diverse. Its top donors are the World Bank (or its 
“IDA”), the European Commission, the United States, and the combined weight of 
Nordic states (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland).  
 The most important analysis of aid conditionality in Mozambique does not lend 
itself to clear conclusions. Hanlon’s exploration into the deep historical ties between 
Frelimo party members and its aid donors reveals a complicated picture: conditionality is 
more lax – that is, donors generally give budget support so that governments can “own” 
their own strategies. Yet while donors have realized that they cannot force their own 
political will to reduce corruption or spur governance reform, they are still ironically and 
heavily involved in the policymaking process – indeed, they withheld food aid in the 
1990s when World Bank and IMF policy changes were not followed through on.134 
Harrison agrees with Hanlon, noting that is it “far less insightful to make distinctions 
between internal and external interests” because donors will in one instance care less 
about the 2004 rampant electoral fraud but successfully block the establishment of a 
development bank to provide rural credit. Still, Hanlon concludes that as of the late 
2000s, Frelimo may accept donor demands for liberaliation but either won’t fully 
implement them, quietly reverse them later, or will not be subservient at all when 
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“political and personal interests are at stake.”135 Land reform appears to be one of the 
more recent outliers, as Frelimo refused to privatize land even while the party was under 
considerable external pressure. President Guebuza made very clear at a USAID meeting 
in 2006 that he would not privatize land, an action less passive than defiance behavior in 
the past.  
 When Frelimo presents the face of political stability and agrees to certain –but not 
all – neoliberal economic reforms, donors usually allow large-scale corruption to go 
unchecked. But because donors have recently been unable or unwilling to enforce its 
demands for political and economic liberalization and while Frelimo only meets demands 
that do not run against the interests of its highest members, it would appear that the neo-
patrimonial thesis has better captured current relations in the internal-external 
constellation of forces that shape policymaking and foreign leases to farmland. The case 
of Mozambique runs against the conclusions of scholars who suggest that foreign aid and 
budget support is halted or frozen when democratic credentials are lost or political 
liberalization is not adhered to – this occurred in Ethiopia, Uganda, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
Madagascar and Rwanda.136 
 
Conclusion: evaluating the approaches 
 Both approaches have their flaws and perhaps a synthesis between them would be 
most appropriate to capture the particular blend of influences that shape neoliberal reform 
in Mozambique. For instance, the concept of global neoliberal hegemony is certainly one 
of the most advanced conceptualizations in theory and in the field. The neo-patrimonial 
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approach can absorb this theoretical work within its own notion of dependency and post-
colonial yoke.  
While the externalist thesis rightly points to the deep and unbroken historical ties 
between international financial institutions, aid donors, and Frelimo, the influence of 
external agencies and actors has lessened to a considerable degree. This is evident in how 
the character of liberal reform changed (not to mention the blatant reversal of democratic 
liberal reforms) in the 1990s and 2000s. The neo-patrimonial approach does not suggest 
that there is no or even insignificant influence from external forces but rather that ruling 
elites often shift their positions and policies to maintain their dependency on foreign 
institutions while carrying out their own agendas and maintaining patron-client relations. 
De Renzio and Hanlon (2007) describes this aptly: “Mozambicans within Frelimo and in 
senior government posts have developed advanced skills at managing complex relations 
with a diverse range of international agencies, juggling their difference priorities and 
demands, and positively responding to their agendas, while at the same time maintaining 
internal political support.” The literature from neoliberalism and specifically the more 
recent insights suggest that we must look at governance as networked. Where privilege 
has been formally and informally reorganized in terms of credit access for foreign 
investors and wealthy domestic investors, the accompanying reorganization of privilege, 
space (land), and accumulation favors a group of business elites and foreign interests. 
When the Fifth Party Congress removed restrictions to personal investment and 
accumulation for party members in 1989, now market-inspired policies newly justify and 
enable elites to expropriate land and seek new avenues for personal enrichment, while 
making these policies seem “foreign-driven”.  
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 Future research might employ different theories and may also find that neoliberal 
governance and external influences vary across African states. Other frameworks, such as 
Wallerstein’s “world systems” theory and “negotiated peripheralization” could be 
employed to more carefully evaluate what may be the co-optation of African states into a 
world-system, a system that affords their economies a lesser status in the wider global 
economy. Other work might unseat traditional views – such as the notion that the state 
conflicts with the informal economy – and instead analyze the ways that African states 
engage in “informalization strategies”, whereby governance is established through 
connections with non-governmental entities (rebel groups, private militias, NGOs) and 
through informal practices of its own elites. This may better explain how governments 
“partially privatize” where they meet the demands of both their clients internally and 
donors externally.  
 Finally, I want to stress that while a neoliberal strategy of foreign agricultural 
investment for Mozambique’s food security is wildly inappropriate, rural development 
strategies must be met with foreign investment. More engagement of family cooperatives 
or larger associations will prove most beneficial for Mozmabique’s precarious and 
gloomy food crisis.  
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